Arusha Peace Agreement 1993 Pdf

In a cable to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Flaten wrote: “… Post does not know if there is a critical mass in the military that supports the democratic transition. If peace were to happen, integration and demobilization would be the determining factors in determining whether democracy would survive in Rwanda. The “neutral international force” was deployed to Rwanda at the end of October 1993 as the United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords signed in August 1993. The UNAMIR force commander, General Roméo Dallaire, writes in a weekly report on the situation that the Rwandan government is “crying” over possible attacks by RPF and Uganda troops, and also reports a massacre in Ruhengeri Prefecture, as these two incidents have an impact on the implementation of the Arusha agreements. Tensions that escalated during the power-sharing negotiations have infiltrated the streets of Rwanda and have clearly linked tense political discussions to outbursts of violence. Joyce Leader, Deputy Head of Mission at the U.S. Embassy (DCM) in Rwanda, wrote in August 1992: “… We can anticipate a new wave of internal insecurity in one way or another if peace talks continue, especially when internal disputes over the integration of the [military] armed forces become acute. (document 4) The Arusha Agreements, Officially, the peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, also known as the Arusha Peace Agreement or Arusha Negotiations, was a series of five agreements (or protocols) signed on 4 August 1993 in Arusha, Tanzania, by the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Rebel Patriotic Front (RPF) under mediation to end three years of Rwandan civil war. In the African Great Lakes region, discussions began on July 12, 1992 and ended on August 4, 1993, when the agreements were finally signed.

[1] The United States representative to the United Nations, Madeline Albright, wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the possibility of sending a peacekeeping force to Rwanda to support the implementation of the Arusha Agreements that the parties will soon sign and to “create the atmosphere of stability”. It states that a neutral international force should be a “classic peacekeeping operation” because “peacekeeping has already been (almost) achieved by Tanzanians with the signing of the Arusha Agreements.” It also calls into question the commitment of all parties to the implementation of peace agreements. It notes that the intentions of the other parties are generally suspicious, which could pose problems for the integration of the armed forces. She writes: “Although the leaders of both sides have signed the peace agreement, neither side trusts the intentions of the other side.